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Abstract 
 
 This paper examines the „currency enigma” which arises because despite financial 
innovation that has created important new substitutes for cash usage, U.S. per capita 
currency holdings now amount to $2700. American households and businesses admit 
to holding only 15 percent of the stock of currency outside of the banking system. 
Some fraction of unaccounted for currency is held overseas (the dollarization 
hypothesis) and some is held domestically undeclared, as a store of value and a 
medium of exchange for transactions involving the production and distribution of 
illegal goods and services, and for transactions involving incomes that are not 
reported to the IRS (the underground economy hypothesis). 
 We first revisit the longstanding controversy concerning the fraction of U.S. 
currency held abroad and find that newly revised estimates of U.S. overseas currency 
stocks estimates the fraction overseas at 37 percent, rather than the widely cited figure 
of 65 percent.  A more refined proxy places the fraction abroad closer to 30 percent. 
New estimates of overseas holdings permit calculation of domestic currency holdings, 
as well as narrow and broad measures of domestic monetary aggregates. These are 
tested to determine their ability to predict fluctuations in real output and prices. The 
domestic currency figures are then used to estimate the current amount of “unreported 
income” which approaches $2 trillion, implying a “tax gap” in 2008 of between $446- 
$490 billion. 
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Introduction: The Currency Enigma Revisited  
 One of the most reliable economic statistics is the amount of U.S. currency in 
circulation held outside of depository intuitions by the public. Over the past decades we 
have witnessed a host of cash-saving financial innovations, leading to widespread 
predictions of the advent of a “cashless society”.  But contrary to expectations, the United 
States is awash in cash. By the beginning of 2009, U.S. currency in circulation with the 
public had risen to an astounding $824 billion dollars, amounting to $2700 for every man, 
woman and child in the country, suggesting that the average American household holds 
$10,500 in cash. Over the last twenty years, real (inflation adjusted) per capita currency 
holdings increased by 59 percent  and currency as a fraction of the M1 money supply rose 
from 28 percent to 52 percent. 
  To put these figures in perspective, they suggest that the bulging average 
American wallet holds 87 pieces of U.S. currency consisting of: 31 one dollar bills; 7 
fives; 5 tens; 20 twenties; 4 fifties and 20 one hundred dollar bills. Few of us will 
recognize ourselves as “average” citizens. Clearly, these amounts of currency are not 
normally necessary for those of us simply wishing to make payments when neither credit 
cards nor checks are accepted or convenient. 
  Federal Reserve surveys (Avery et al. 1986, 1987) of household currency usage 
found that U.S. residents admitted to holding only $150 in 1986 and a subsequent survey 
in 1995 lowered that figure to $100. With households admitting to holding less than 10% 
of the nation‟s currency supply and businesses (Anderson, 1977; Sumner, 1990) less than 
5%, the whereabouts of roughly 85% of the nation‟s currency supply is unknown. These 
anomalous findings suggest that the “currency enigma” (Feige 1989, 1994) and the 
problem of “missing currency” (Sprenkel, 1993) is still very much with us. 
                                                 
1
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 The currency enigma has both a stock and a flow dimension. First we must 
determine who holds the missing dollars.  Specifically, how much of this missing 
currency is abroad, and how much is held domestically by citizens reluctant to report 
their true cash holdings. The flow issue concerns the amount of cash payments sustained 
by that missing currency. If half of the missing currency is hoarded and the other half is 
used as a medium of exchange, turning over at an average velocity of between 30 and 50 
turnovers per year the missing circulating currency stock would give rise to a flow of 
“missing payments” of an order of magnitude comparable to the entire GNP of the United 
States. 
 The location of America‟s currency stock and the frequency of its use (currency 
turnover or velocity) have important implications for a variety of economic issues.  If a 
large fraction of U.S. currency is held abroad, U.S. citizens derive considerable benefit 
from seigniorage, namely, the ability of the U.S. government to obtain interest free loans 
from foreign citizens holding U.S. dollars. U.S. dollars have historically been perceived 
to have many desirable properties that made them attractive to both domestic and foreign 
holders. As a relatively stable currency the dollar functioned as a safe and portable store 
of value, protecting users against the threat of bank failures, devaluations and inflation. 
As an anonymous and widely accepted means of payment that left no paper trail, it has 
long been considered the preferred medium of exchange for “underground” transactions. 
More recently, the growing popularity of the Euro and the recent economic crisis appear 
to have weakened overseas demand for U.S. dollars. 
  From the perspective of conducting domestic monetary policy, the relevant 
monetary aggregates are the domestic money supply and the domestic monetary base 
(Feige, 1994). To determine the domestic components of the monetary aggregates, the 
Federal Reserve needs to know the fraction of U.S. currency abroad and the annual net 
outflow of currency overseas. Similarly, foreign monetary authorities need to know the 
extent to which their nations are “dollarized” and the changes in net inflows of foreign 
currencies over time. 
 The whereabouts of U.S. currency also has fiscal consequences. U.S. currency is a 
preferred medium of exchange for facilitating clandestine transactions, and for storing 
illicit and untaxed wealth. Knowledge of its location and usage is required to estimate the 
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origins and volume of illicit transactions. Most important among these are the drug trade 
and the amount of income that is not properly reported to the fiscal authorities, namely, 
“unreported income” and its consequences for the “tax gap”. This latter issue gains 
increasing importance at a time of severe fiscal deficits that could be reduced by 
increased tax compliance.    
 It is to these issues we now turn. Section 1 reviews the evolution of the currency 
stock and its denomination structure. Section 2 reviews the empirical controversy 
concerning the amounts of U.S. currency held abroad, and Section 3 examines our state 
of knowledge concerning the specific location of U.S. dollars overseas. Section 4 
develops new estimates of domestic monetary aggregates and examines their predictive 
power in explaining fluctuations in inflation and real output. Section 5 utilizes estimates 
of the domestic currency supply to calculate the size and growth of the “unreported” 
economy in the U.S. and provides new fiscal estimates of the “tax gap”. The final section 
summarizes the implications of our findings. 
 
1) The Evolution of Cash and its Denomination Structure 
 Financial innovation creates many substitutes for cash. Credit and debit cards, 
electronic payments, EZ pass transponders on toll roads, and pre-paid phone cards are 
common examples. Yet all predictions concerning the advent of a “cashless” society have 
proved false as evidenced by the evolution of currency held by the public between 1963 
and 2008.  
 As shown in Figure 1, U.S. cash holdings increased from $32.2 billion in 1963 to 
$812.4 billion by the end of 2008.  Moreover, real per capital cash holdings which 
remained roughly stable over the first twenty year period have more than doubled during 
the most recent fifteen years. 
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Figure 1
Currency and Real Per Capita Currency
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  An examination of the evolution of the denomination structure of currency 
(Figure 2) reveals that fraction of the currency stock made up of the smallest 
denominations the ($1-5) declined from 12.6 percent to 2.6 percent during the past 35 
years while the ($10-20) denominations dropped from 57.1 percent to 16.6 percent. The 
$50 denomination fluctuated around a 10% level whereas the $100 denomination showed 
the most dramatic increase, rising from 20.9% in 1963 to 73.3% in 2008.   
 
Figure 2
Percent of Currency by Denomination
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 This radical change in the denomination structure might be explained as a result 
of changes in the consumer price index which increased more than six and a half fold 
over the past 35 years. Figure 3 depicts the real value of currency held by the public in 
different denominations. The real value of smaller denomination notes remained roughly 
constant with a slight rise in the holdings of the $50 notes. However, the real holdings of 
$100 bills increased fifteen fold during this period. The $100 bill is most likely used as a 
store of value although its efficacy as a store of value has declined due to inflation. 
Figure 3
Real Value of Circulating Currency by Denomination
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Nevertheless, the demand for $100 bills continued to rise in both nominal and real terms. 
One possible explanation is the “dollarization” hypothesis, (Feige, 2003; 2004) 
suggesting that U.S. currency, and particularly $100 bills are widely demanded as a 
second currency in foreign countries experiencing banking crises, political instability 
and/or hyper-inflations. 
  An alternative source of cash demand arises from its use as a medium of 
exchange and store of value in the “underground” economy.  One of the key attributes of 
currency is anonymity, since its usage does not leave a paper trail. As such it is the 
preferred medium for purchasing illegal goods and for hiding income that should be, but 
is not reported to the tax authority. The problem then is to determine what fraction of the 
U.S. currency supply is held abroad and what fraction is held domestically, albeit, 
somewhat clandestinely. 
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2) The controversy over how much U.S. currency is abroad 
 The currency enigma has provoked considerable controversy concerning the 
fraction of U.S. currency held abroad. Examination of both direct and indirect methods, 
(employing variants of monetary demography models) led Feige (1996; 1997) to 
conclude that the most plausible estimates of overseas holdings of U.S. currency “are in 
the range of 25-45 percent”, whereas Porter and Judson (1996), relying on their 
“seasonal” method, clsimed that by 1995 the share of currency held abroad had reached 
70%. Porter and Judson also reported a “median flow estimate” for 1995 of 55 percent 
abroad, similar to the Anderson and Rasche (1997) estimates of 53.2 percent. Most 
recently, the United States Treasury Department (2006)
2
 concluded that “ Today, we 
estimate that nearly 60 percent of all U.S. banknotes in circulation, or about $450 billion 
of the $760 billion in circulation as of December 2005, is now held abroad”. 
 Because different approaches have produced an unsettlingly wide range of 
estimates, we review the main data sources employed to determine the amount of U.S. 
currency overseas and present new estimates which suggest that by 2008; only 30-37 
percent of U.S. currency appears to be held overseas. This dramatic downward revision in 
the estimated amount of currency held abroad (37 percent), has now been officially 
adopted by both the Bureau of Economic Analysis
3
 and the Federal Reserve
4
. Both 
agencies have recently issued major statistical revisions for the period 1974-2007 
reflecting these lower estimated amounts of currency circulating abroad.
5
 
 
 Direct Data Sources of Currency Inflows and Outflows Abroad 
 a) New York Federal Reserve Bank Reports 
 At present, there is no information system that collects comprehensive data on the 
total amounts of currency flowing into and out of the U.S. Large shipments of U.S. 
currency are typically handled by a number of commercial banks who act as bank-note 
                                                 
2
 Page iv. 
3
 BEA News release. June 17, 2008.  
4
 The new figures appear in the 2008 Flow of Funds Z1 Tables F-204 and L-204, however no mention is 
made of the change in method employed to estimate the revised series of currency flows abroad. 
5
 As recently as 2007, Jankowski, Porter and Rice (2007) continue to assert that “the share of $100 bills 
held abroad has decreased from its peak of 70 percent, and more recently , held steady at about 65 percent” 
(p.2) 
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brokers specializing in wholesale bulk currency transport. Interviews with Federal 
Reserve officials suggests that the main source of currency provided to these bulk 
shippers comes from the New York Federal Reserve, with smaller portions originating in 
the San Francisco and Atlanta Federal Reserve districts.  
 Since 1988, bulk currency transporters informally reported their overseas 
shipments and receipts to the New York Reserve Bank which maintains an internal 
confidential data base on these currency inflows and outflows. The most recent publicly 
released information pertaining to these figures reports that over the eighteen year period 
from 1988-2005, net currency shipments abroad reported by wholesale currency brokers 
amounted to $130 billion.
6
  
 b) The FR-160 Proxy  
 Since most bulk shipments of currency are in the form of $100 notes, Feige 
(1994) proposed using a proxy for these confidential data based on the Federal Reserve‟s 
FR-160 cash accounting system
7
. The FR-160 reports contain monthly data on 
denomination specific flows of currency paid into circulation (PIC) and received from 
circulation (RFC) for each of the 37 Federal Reserve cash offices. The FR-160 proxy, 
[measuring net injections (PIC-RFC) of $100 by the New York Federal Reserve cash 
office] was so highly correlated with the internal New York Fed‟s series on bulk 
shipments that it was initially viewed as an appropriate proxy for net currency shipments 
abroad.
8
 Recognizing that shipments and receipts of currency to and from the Asian 
markets often originated at the Los Angeles cash office of the Federal Reserve, the Board 
of Governors of the Federal Reserve (BOG) and the Bureau of Economic Analysis
9
 
(BEA) adopted a refinement of the original proxy measure, [total net disbursements of 
$100 notes from the New York City and Los Angeles cash offices (NYLA)] as the new 
official measure of currency flows abroad. The NYLA proxy was regularly reported in 
the Flow of Funds Accounts Z1 (Table F. 204, Line 23) and in the BEA‟s International 
Transactions Accounts (Table 1, Line 67). Corresponding estimates of the cumulative 
                                                 
6
 Secretary of the Treasury Report to Congress, 2006. p. 28  
7
 The historical background and evolution of the FR-160 reporting system  is contained in the Board of 
Governors technical memorandum #91 entitled “ Processing Procedures for the Cash Series”, November, 
1988. 
8
 Feige, 1994.  
9
 Bach ,1997. 
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stock of U.S. currency abroad were published in the Flow of Funds (Table L.204) and in 
the BEA‟s annual estimates of the U.S. international investment position accounts. Based 
on the NYLA proxy, the BEA estimated that by the end of 2007, the amount of U.S. 
currency held abroad was $398 billion, or 52.5% of the currency in circulation. The 
original NYLA proxy measure of the percent of U.S. currency held abroad is displayed as 
the upper line in Figure 4 for the years 1973-2008.  
 The official NYLA proxy was understood to have several shortcomings. It 
overstated net shipments abroad because some of the net injections of $100 bills 
represented domestic demand for those bills in the NY and LA districts and it took no 
account of net cash inflows from Latin America  that were likely to appear in cash offices 
located in the southern U.S. cities. It understated net shipments abroad because it 
excluded shipments abroad of lower denomination notes and took no account of currency 
flows abroad resulting from tourism, immigrant remittances and U.S. military personnel 
stationed overseas.  
 
Figure 4
Percent of Currency Abroad
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 In response to some of the aforementioned criticisms, the BEA
10
 recently released 
significantly revised estimates of the stocks and flows of U.S. currency abroad for the 
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 BEA (June 17, 2008) News Release 
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period 1974-2007. The new estimates are based on an adjusted flow proxy that measures 
total net disbursements of $100 notes from the New York City, Los Angeles and Miami 
cash offices (NYLAM). The revised estimates decreased the estimated amount of 
currency held abroad at the end of 1973 from $30.5 billion to $7.7 billion. The revised 
series now appears in both the FED Flow of Funds Accounts and the BEA International 
Transactions and International Positions Accounts. 
  According to the newly revised estimates displayed as (NYLAM) in Figure 4, the 
percent of U.S. currency held abroad at the end of 2008 was 37.1 percent, down from the 
former estimate of 54.1 percent. This substantial downward revision suggests that $138.2 
billion, formerly believed to have been held overseas is now officially recognized as 
circulating domestically. 
 Further scrutiny of net cash disbursements of $100 bills from the Federal 
Reserve‟s cash offices in San Antonio (SA), El Paso (EL) and Jacksonville (J) reveals an 
unusual pattern of net cash inflows that cannot be readily explained by tourist inflows 
from other cash offices. These offices, located near our Southern border entry points, are 
likely recipients of funds flowing in from Central and South America. We therefore 
propose to add the net cash disbursements from these additional border cash offices to the 
currency proxy in order to obtain a more reliable estimate of net currency flows abroad. 
The resulting estimated percentage of currency held abroad as measured by the proposed 
proxy (NYLAMSAELJ) is displayed in Figure 4 and suggests that at the end of 2008; 
roughly 30% of U.S. currency was held abroad, amounting to $245.4 billion.    
 c) Currency and Monetary Instrument Reports 
 Another important direct source of information on currency outflows and inflows 
to and from abroad is collected by the U.S. Customs Service as part of its regulatory 
responsibility under the Currency and Foreign Transactions Reporting Act. This act 
requires persons or institutions exporting or importing currency or other monetary 
instruments in excess of $5000
11
 to file a “Report of International Transportation of 
Currency or Monetary Instruments”. Commonly know as “CMIRs” these reports have 
been collected by the U.S. Customs Service since 1977. The CMIR records contain all 
reported cross border currency inflows and outflows including currency physically 
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transported by currency retailers, non-financial businesses and individuals and currency 
shipped by financial institutions specializing in wholesale currency transactions.
12
  
 The unique feature of the CMIR reports is that reported currency inflows and 
outflows can be aggregated by origin and destination. With the cooperation of the U.S. 
Customs Service and the U.S. Treasury Department Financial Crimes Enforcement 
Network, the information contained in the millions of accumulated confidential CMIR 
forms was combined by a specially designed algorithm that aggregated CMIR outflows 
(CTO) and inflows (CTI) so as to maintain the confidentiality of individual records in the 
CMIR data system. CMIR reports have their own limitations in so far as they exclude 
currency transactions that fall below the reporting requirement; shipments that 
circumvent the legal reporting requirements and direct shipments by Federal Reserve 
Banks which are not required to file a CMIR. In the analysis that follows we have 
adjusted the CMIR data to include shipments and receipts of currency made directly by 
the New York Federal Reserve. We denote these adjusted aggregated CMIR outflows as 
CTOadj and the adjusted aggregated CMIR inflows as CTIadj.. 
 Figures 5 and 6 respectively display alternative estimates of currency outflows 
and inflows for the period for which the CMIR data were available. Figure 5 reveals that 
between 1977 and 1995, reported CMIR outflows were generally below the two 
alternative FR 160 proxy measures.
13
 This shortfall results in part from the failure of 
CMIR‟s to capture currency outflows falling below the filing threshold and because there 
is a general lack of awareness and enforcement of the requirement for individuals to file 
these reports when leaving the country. Individuals entering the country typically pass 
through customs and are specifically asked to fill out a CMIR form if they are carrying 
cash amounts above the threshold. The differential awareness and enforcement is 
reflected by the fact that roughly five times as many arriving travelers filed CMIR forms 
than did departing travelers and that recorded CMIR inflows for the period 1977-1995 are 
highly consistent with the two proxy flows as displayed in Figure 6.
14
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 For a detailed analysis of the CMIR data see Feige (1997). 
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 The correlation coefficients between CMIR outflows and NYLAM and NYLAMSAELJ outflows for the 
period 1977-1995 are respectively .897 and .892. However the mean annual outflow for CMIR is almost $5 
billion below the means of the two alternative outflow measures. 
14
 The correlation coefficients between CMIR inflows and NYLAM and NYLAMSAELJ inflows for the 
period 1977-1995 are respectively .988 and .989 with comparable means. 
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Figure 5
Estimated Currency Outflows
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Figure 6
Estimated Currency Inflows
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We conclude that for the period 1977-1995 CMIR estimates of net currency flows abroad 
are understated, and should, at best, be considered as a lower bound estimate of the net 
currency sent abroad. 
 In 1996 the Treasury Department introduced a newly designed $100 
denomination banknote with improved security features. In order to facilitate the rapid 
introduction of the new notes and to expedite the repatriation of older designed notes, the 
Federal Reserve established the Extended Custodial Inventory (ECI) program, creating 
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overseas cash depots managed by the New York Federal Reserve. One of the unintended 
consequences of the establishment of the ECI program was to degrade the quality of 
CMIR reports, which now failed to appropriately capture currency outflows from the 
ECI‟s to other countries as well as currency reflows from foreign countries back to the 
overseas ECIs.  Figures 5 and 6 displays the decline in measured CMIR outflows and 
inflows following the introduction of the ECI program. Taking the currency NYLAM 
proxy as a basis, it appears that the CMIR data understate net outflows during the period 
1996-2001 by roughly $19 billion per year. 
 The most significant conclusion resulting from our review of alternative measures 
of overseas currency is that far less currency appears to be circulating overseas than was 
previously thought to be the case. For 2008, the original “official” estimate of the percent 
of currency overseas was 51.4 percent whereas the new FED/BEA estimate stands at 37.3 
percent. If we include data from the three additional southern border cash offices that are 
known to receive considerable amounts of currency from Latin America, the estimate is 
reduced to 30.1 percent abroad. When the official estimate of the stock of currency held 
abroad in 1987 is combined with the estimated flows of currency shipped abroad between 
1988 and 2005 by specialized currency brokers
15
, the calculated percent of currency held 
abroad in 2005 is 24.0 percent. CMIR estimates of overseas currency holdings would be 
considerably lower. Based on direct data, the most plausible range of estimates of 
currency held abroad in 2008 is 30 - 37 percent. These new estimates fall far below the 
previously reported estimates (Porter and Judson, 1996) which indicated “that between 50 
percent and 70 percent of the U.S. currency is now held outside the United States”.16 
 The finding that overseas holdings of U.S. currency are considerably smaller than 
were previously thought implies that domestic holdings are even more puzzling. Figure 7 
displays the temporal growth in per capita domestic currency holdings which increased 
from $171 in 1966 to $1674 by the end of 2008.
17
 Real per capita domestic holdings 
increased by 53 percent during the period. As a percentage of GDP, domestic currency 
declined secularly from 1965 to 1998.  The observed increase in the ratio between 1998 
and 2003 may have been stimulated by concerns of a millennium interruption in the 
                                                 
15
 As reported by the New York Federal Reserve. op.cite. footnote 4. 
16
 Secretary of the Treasury Report to Congress, 2006. p. 28.  
17
 These figures are based on the new official Federal Reserve/BEA data employing the NYLAM proxy. 
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functioning of ATM machines and similar concerns resulting from the aftermath of 9/11. 
After 2003 the ratio of domestic currency to GDP resumed its secular decline. 
 
Figure 7
Ratio of Domestic Currency to GDP and Per Capita Domestic Holdings
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3) The Location of U.S. Currency Held Abroad 
 Two sources of data are available for estimating the location of U.S. dollars 
overseas. Between 1994 and 2005 officials from the U.S. Treasury, the Board of 
Governors of the Federal Reserve, the New York Federal Reserve and the U.S. Secret 
Service visited forty-one countries to conduct informal surveys concerning the amount of 
U.S. currency in circulation. The amounts of U.S. currency believed to be held in each 
country are reported in the United States Treasury Department (2006) Table 3.3 and are 
reproduced in Table 1. Unfortunately, the Treasury Report gives no indication of the 
method employed to obtain these “survey” estimates other than to obliquely state in a 
footnote: “For currency holdings, estimates were provided during the teams visit to each 
country and thus are estimates as of the most recent trip to each country”.18  
 Table 1 also includes estimates of currency held abroad in 12 additional countries 
not visited by the official teams. These additional country estimates are based on 
aggregated CMIR reports of currency inflows and outflows organized by country of 
origin and destination. 
                                                 
18
 P. 25. 
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Table 1 
Foreign Holdings of U.S. Currency 
Country 
U.S. Currency $ 
Billion Country 
U.S. Currency $ 
Billion 
Argentina* 50.0 Indonesia* 2.0 
Armenia** 0.2 Korea* 15.0 
Azerbaijan** 1.3 Latvia* 0.5 
Belarus* 3.0 Lithuania* 0.5 
Bolivia*** 1.2 Mexico* 5.0 
Brazil* 1.0 Nicaragua*** 0.7 
Bulgaria* 1.0 Panama* 2.0 
Cambodia* 2.0 Peru* 5.0 
Chile* 0.3 Paraguay* 0.1 
China* 50.0 Philippines* 2.0 
Colombia* 2.0 Poland* 1.0 
Costa Rica*** 0.8 Romania* 2.0 
Dominican Republic* 1.5 Russia* 80.0 
Ecuador* 1.0 Singapore* 1.0 
Egypt* 1.0 South Africa* 2.0 
El Salvador* 1.0 Taiwan* 1.0 
Estonia** 0.6 Thailand* 0.3 
Hong Kong* 2.0 Turkey* 10.0 
Hungary** 0.3 Ukraine** 6.4 
Kazakhstan** 17.1 Uruguay*** 2.6 
Kyrgyzstan** 0.1 Venezuela*** 2.5 
  Vietnam* 3.0 
  Total 281.7 
Sources:* Secretary of the Treasury Report (2006) P.25; ** Feige and Dean (2004) Table 14.1, p.309; *** 
Feige et al. (2003) Table 2.1. p. 53. 
 
 To examine the consistency of the “informal survey” results with the BEA/FED 
estimates of total currency abroad, we note that the amount of currency reportedly held in 
the 31 visited countries ($248.1 billion) during the period 1994-2005 exceeds the new 
official BEA/Fed estimate of the average amount of currency held abroad ($205.4 billion) 
during this period by $42.7 billion. The additional CMIR country estimates bring this 
discrepancy to $76.3 billion. We suspect that the anecdotal evidence presented as survey 
results grossly overstate U.S. currency holdings abroad. 
 Table 1 does however provide a rough insight into the distribution of U.S 
currency by major region. Figure 8 displays the regional composition of overseas 
holdings of U.S. currency. The greatest degree of dollarization appears to occur in the 
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transition countries with Russia being the most dollarized country. Latin America and 
Asia each hold over a quarter of the reported overseas holdings with Argentina and China 
being the major consumers. 
Figure 8
Distribution of US Currency Abroad
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 The key finding that foreign holdings of U.S. currency amount to roughly one 
third of total U.S. currency in circulation implies that estimated seigniorage earnings (the 
value of the interest free loan obtained from overseas currency holders) is lower as well. 
Over the past decade, the revised data suggest that the U.S. government‟s annual 
seigniorage earnings averaged $8.6 billion from foreign holders of U.S. currency. 
 
4) The Money, Output, Inflation Controversy 
 The stability and information content of the relationship between monetary 
aggregates and real output and inflation has been the subject of considerable controversy 
in macroeconomics since Sims (1972) discovered a unidirectional causality from money 
and income. Feige and Pearce (1979) showed that this empirical finding was highly 
sensitive to alternative specifications and concluded that “the relationship between money 
and income appears to be casual rather than causal.”  
 As time series analysis became more sophisticated, Friedman and Kuttner (1992) 
reexamined the relationship between monetary aggregates and real income and prices in a 
trivariate autoregressive framework and found that the “the U.S. experience does not 
indicate a close relationship between money and non-financial economic activity.” Their 
key finding that “there is no evidence to show that fluctuations in money contain any 
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information about subsequent movements in income or prices” is the hypothesis we wish 
to reexamine in light of our new information concerning the amounts of currency 
circulating abroad.   
 Feige (1994) suggested that “if a sizable and variable fraction of currency is held 
abroad, reliance on conventional monetary aggregates which include total currency in 
circulation would be misleading. The appropriate monetary aggregates to monitor would 
be the domestic monetary base and the domestic money supply rather than the total 
monetary base and the total money supply.” Aksoy and Piskorski (2006) recently 
provided partial evidence to support this conjecture. They reexamined the Friedman 
Kuttner (1992) results employing earlier estimates of the domestic currency supply and 
found that „currency corrected for foreign holdings has increased marginal predictive 
content for U.S. inflation and real output relative to standard unadjusted money series.” 
Employing the same autoregressive specification for real output changes and inflation as 
used by Friedman and Kuttner (1992) and Aksoy and Piskorski (2006), we compare the 
results of Granger causality relationships between the newly revised domestic monetary 
aggregates and output and inflation and those based on conventional monetary 
aggregates. 
 Empirical consideration of whether monetary aggregates can usefully play a role 
in monetary policy depends upon whether they help to predict future fluctuations in real 
income or prices that are not already predictable on the basis of fluctuations of income 
itself or price fluctuations. We therefore examine -square tests of the null hypothesis 
that all of the coefficients on the lagged growth of various monetary aggregates are zero 
in autoregressions of the form: 
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where y, p, and m are respectively, the quarterly growth rates of real output, inflation 
and alternative monetary aggregates.
19
 
 Table 2 presents the p-values of the Granger causality -square statistics 
computed with White (1980) heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors. The null  
 
Table 2 
p-Values:Granger Causality: Χ square-Statistic 
 
Variable  Real Output Inflation 
  
1974:2-
2008:4 
1974:2-
2008:4 
    
Domestic Monetary Aggregates     
    
Domestic Currency component current ln(Cdom)NYLAM 0.098 0.003 
Domestic Currency Proposed ln(Cdom)NYLAMSAELJ 0.039 0.001 
    
Domestic M1adj Current ln(M1dom)adjNYLAM 0.324 0.015 
Domestic M1adj proposed ln(M1dom)adjNYLAMSAELJ 0.321 0.016 
    
Domestic M2 Current ln(M2dom)NYLAM 0.119 0.783 
Domestic M2 proposed ln(M2dom)NYLAMSAELJ 0.115 0.786 
    
MBBoG domestic Current ln(Mbdom)BoG.NYLAM 0.267 0.317 
MBBoG domestic Proposed ln(Mbdom)BoG.NYLAMSAELJ 0.292 0.236 
    
MBSL domestic current ln(Mbdom)SL.NYLAM 0.115 0.456 
MBSL domestic proposed ln(Mbdom)SL.NYLAMSAELJ 0.114 0.382 
    
Uncorrected Monetary Aggregates    
Currency Component of M1 ln(C) 0.150 0.736 
M1 ln(M1) 0.464 0.010 
M1adj for Sweeps ln(M1)adj 0.303 0.013 
M2 ln(M2) 0.099 0.748 
MBBoG ln(Mb)BoG 0.062 0.871 
MBSL ln(Mb)SL 0.021 0.982 
FED Funds rate ln(Funds) 0.000 0.229 
 
                                                 
19
 Real output is measured by real GDP; inflation by the GDP deflator and the monetary aggregates are 
respectively, C = Currency component of M1, M1= the M1 money supply; M2= M2 money supply; MbSL 
= the St. Louis Federal Reserve monetary base; ; MbBoG=Board of Governors Monetary base;  Cdom = 
domestic currency; M1dom = domestic M1 money supply; M2dom = domestic M2 money supply; Mbdom = 
domestic monetary base. 
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hypothesis is that all coefficients on the lagged financial variables, considered 
individually in the autoregressive specifications, are zero. 
 Table 2 is similar to the presentation in Aksoy and Piskorski (2006) who used the 
earlier estimates of domestic currency based on the NYLA proxy for foreign holdings 
described in section 2 above. Our estimates of domestic currency holdings are derived 
from the newly revised official BEA/FED estimates of foreign holdings based on the 
NYLAM proxy, and on our proposed NYLAMSAELJ proxy. Additionally, we examine 
estimates of the M1, M2, and MB aggregates corrected for alternative estimates of 
domestic currency holdings. 
 Table 2 reveals that in the real output equations, the only variables significant at 
5% are the Fed Funds rate, the St. Louis  monetary base and the proposed domestic 
currency component. At the 10% level we find that the conventional BOG monetary 
base, the M2 monetary aggregate and the current estimate of domestic currency 
component are significant. We find no significant predictive content for either the 
conventional narrow monetary aggregates or the domestic monetary aggregates other 
than the currency component. 
 The conclusions are quite different for the inflation equations. At the 5% 
significance level we find that the domestic currency component and both the 
conventional and domestic narrow money supply aggregates are significant. However, 
none of the other conventional monetary aggregates, (M2 and monetary base) nor the 
domestic M2 and base aggregates have significant predictive content for inflation.  
 Our findings, covering a longer time period, and revised estimates of the domestic 
currency component confirm the Askoy and Piskorski (2006) results that domestic 
currency has significant predictive content for both real output and inflation. However, 
with the exception of the domestic M1 money supply in the inflation equation, none of 
the other domestic monetary aggregates appear to have significant predictive content for 
either real output or inflation. 
  
5) Implications for the Underground Economy and the Tax Gap 
 In order to generate a time series estimate of the relative size of the underground 
economy (Yu/Yo), we confine our discussion to the estimation of “unreported income” 
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(Yu), namely the difference between the amount of income that should be reported to the 
tax authority (under full compliance with the tax code) and the amount actually reported 
(Yo), namely adjusted gross income (AGI). The most common method for estimating the 
relative size of the underground economy relies on some variant of the general currency 
ratio model described in Feige (1989). 
 The most restrictive specification of the currency ratio model [Cagan (1958), 
Gutmann (1977)] assumes that currency is the exclusive medium of exchange for 
unreported transactions, that the ratio of currency to checkable deposits remains constant 
except for changes induced by the growth of unreported income and that the amount of 
unreported income produced by a dollar of currency transacted in the unreported sector is 
the same as the amount of reported income produced by a dollar of currency transacted in 
the reported economy. In order to obtain a benchmark estimate of the size of the 
unreported sector, the restrictive model assumes that in some benchmark year (1940) the 
underground economy (unreported income) is zero.
20
 
 In the analysis that follows, we relax the restrictive model with several important 
modifications. Since our concern is with estimating the amount of unreported income in 
the U.S., the first modification is to employ estimates of domestic currency in circulation 
(Cdom) rather than the total amount of currency in circulation (C). The second 
modification involves taking account of the technological innovations in the financial 
industry which significantly reduced the volume of “checkable deposits” (D) in the mid 
1990‟s.21  During this period, banks began to offer retail sweep programs, in which 
checkable deposits were swept into money market deposit accounts, enabling banks to 
profitably reduce the level of demand deposits subject to reserve requirements. During 
the first quarter of 1994 these “sweeps” amounted to only $7.5 billion dollars but have 
subsequently increased to $775 billion in 2008. By including these “sweeps” in our 
definition of “checkable deposits”, we take account of an important factor affecting the 
conventional C/D ratio which is unrelated to developments in the unreported economy.  
                                                 
20
 As described in Feige (1989) these restrictions imply that the ratio of unreported income(Yu)to reported 
income Yo can be estimated as follows: 
Yu/Yo =(C-koD)/ (ko+1) D where C = Currency, D= Checkable deposits and ko= (Co/Do), the currency 
deposit ratio in the official economy which is observed in the year (1940) when the underground economy 
is assumed to be zero. 
21
 Checkable deposits are defined as the sum of demand deposits and other “checkable deposits”.  
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 Figure 9 displays the effects of these two adjustments by comparing the 
conventional C/D ratio employed in many published estimates of the underground 
economy with the new C/D ratio adjusted for both domestic currency holdings and 
sweeps. 
Figure 9
Conventional and Adjusted C/D Ratio
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 A further modification of the conventional currency ratio model is to drop the 
assumption that unreported income in 1940 was zero and instead to benchmark estimates 
of unreported income to a year in which an independent estimate of the ratio Yut/Yot =αt 
is available.
22
  Two years were chosen for our benchmark estimates, 1988 and 2001. The 
1988 benchmark is taken from the IRS (1988) report which estimates unreported 
incomes
23
 and the corresponding tax gaps
24
 for the years 1972-1992. These IRS 
projections are based on the Taxpayer Compliance Measurement Program (TCMP) 
undertaken in the years 1979 and 1982.
25
 For the year 1988, the ratio of legal misreported 
income to total reported taxable income was 18.8 percent and the ratio of legal 
misreported income to adjusted gross income was 14.5 percent. Our 1988 benchmark 
estimate for Yu/Yo is 16.7 percent, where Yu represents legal plus illegal unreported 
                                                 
22
 Given αt, the equation in footnote 19 can be solved for kot to derive a new benchmark estimate for 
generating the temporal development of Yu/Yo. 
23
 IRS (1988) Table D-17. 
24
 IRS (1988) Table D-17 and Table F1. 
25
 These latter TCMP audits were more accurate than earlier audits because the examiner now had 
information return documents on individual returns available during the time of the audit. 
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income and Yo represents AGI. We regard this as a lower bound estimate since the IRS 
acknowledges that “despite the intensity of the TCMP examinations, some income still 
goes undetected.”26  
 The most recent year for which the IRS published a “tax gap”27 estimate was 
2002. The tax gap was estimated to be $345 billion dollars.
28
 In order to construct a 
benchmark estimate of Yu/Yo for 2001, we first divide the IRS tax gap estimate by the 
average marginal federal income tax rate from the NBER TAXSIM model in order to 
obtain an estimate of total unreported income (Yu).  We then divide (Yu) by actual AGI 
(Yo) in order to obtain the benchmark estimate Yu/Yo for the year 2001. This benchmark 
underestimates the true value of Yu/Yo because the IRS tax gap excludes unpaid taxes on 
illegal income, and hence the unreported illegal income that we consider to be part of Yu.  
 Figure 10 displays the currency model‟s time series estimates of the ratio of 
unreported income to reported income (AGI) based on the IRS benchmarks for 1988 and 
2001 respectively.  
Figure 10
Ratio of Unreported Income to Reported Income (AGI)
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 IRS (1988) p. A-5. 
27
 The tax gap is defined by the IRS “as the aggregate amount of true tax liability imposed by law for a 
given tax year that is not paid voluntarily and timely. It is important to emphasize that IRS estimates of 
the tax gap are associated with the legal sector of the economy only. Although tax is due on income from 
whatever source derived, legal or illegal, the tax attributable to income earned from illegal activities is 
extremely difficult to estimate.” IRS (2007) p.6. 
28
 IRS (2007) p.1. 
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The percentage of unreported income rose dramatically during World War II, declined 
during the post war period and then remained roughly stable until 1973, when it again 
rose to a temporary peak in 1982. The 1980‟s and 90‟s displayed considerable 
fluctuations in the Yu/Yo ratio which Cebula (1997) and Cebula et. al. (1998) showed 
could be explained by variations in tax rates, dissatisfaction with government and audit 
rates. During the past decade the percentage of unreported income increased substantially 
approaching the peak levels attained during the World War II period. By 2008 unreported 
income as a percent of AGI is estimated to range between 22.2 and 24.4 percent.  
 The implications for the estimated tax gap over the past four decades are 
displayed in Figure 11 which also includes the IRS estimates of the tax gap for the years 
it published such estimates. During the past five years the tax gap appears to have 
increased dramatically, and by 2008 the gap is estimated to be between $447 - $490 
billion dollars.
29
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 It should be noted that our estimate of both unreported income and the tax gap are 
based exclusively on the use of domestic currency in unreported activities. Recent 
attention has been focused on an additional tax gap resulting from income earned abroad 
in tax havens. Although we can not trace the source of estimates of overseas tax haven 
evasion, figures as high as $100 billion have been mentioned in the press. Taking account 
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 The estimate for 2008 is based on a projection of AGI. 
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of the tax gap resulting from overseas tax havens, overall tax evasion may cost the U.S. 
government as much $600 billion per year.  
 
6) Summary and Conclusions  
 Financial innovations have created major substitutes for currency, yet by 2009 per 
capita holdings of U.S. currency in circulation outside of the banking system amounted to 
$2700. Surveys of American households and businesses found that they admitted to 
holding less than 15% of this huge stock of U.S. currency, giving rise to what has been 
called the “currency enigma”. Two complementary hypotheses have been advanced to 
explain the whereabouts of the remaining 85% of the currency supply. 
 Some fraction of the currency is believed to be held abroad in nations whose 
citizens and businesses feel it prudent to employ US currency as a substitute for their own 
national currencies as both a medium of exchange and as a store of value. Evidence has 
been brought to bear (Table 1) that extensive “dollarization” occurred, primarily in 
Russia, Argentina and China, but the percentage of the U.S. currency supply believed to 
be held abroad remained in dispute. Porter and Judson (1996) and Jankowski et. al. 
(2007) suggest that at its peak in 1995 as much as 70% of the nation‟s stock of $100 bills 
was held abroad and that in recent years the percentage abroad has stabilized around 
65%. We demonstrate that a new proxy officially endorsed by the Federal Reserve and 
the U.S Bureau of Economic Analysis now places the figure at 37%.  A more refined 
proxy that includes net currency outflows from the U.S. southern Border States puts the 
estimate of total currency abroad at closer to 30%. 
 These new figures imply that domestic per capita holdings of U.S. are in the range 
of $1674-$1855 and that the overwhelming portion of these holdings is in the form of 
$100 bills that are used both as a store of value and as a medium of exchange. Jankowski 
et. al. (2007) studied the Chicago metropolitan area and concluded that Latin American 
immigrants demand “more $100 bills than both native-born residents and immigrants 
from regions other than Latin America.”30 Their empirical findings suggest that this high 
currency demand group only holds an average of between $266 and $329 per capita, less 
                                                 
30
 P. 15.  This increased demand for currency is explained by the fact that this group encounters “obstacles 
to obtaining and using deposit accounts at financial institutions.”(p.17.)  
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than 20% of what we now know to be average per capita domestic holdings. Thus the 
problem of missing currency is still very much alive. 
   Once the effects of overseas dollarization are taken into account, one is left to 
explore a complementary hypothesis concerning the “currency enigma”. Domestic 
currency is known to be the preferred medium of exchange for transactions that 
individuals and businesses wish to conceal. Such transactions include:  the production 
and distribution of illegal goods (drugs) and services (prostitution); and incomes earned 
that are not reported to the fiscal authority in order to evade taxes. We employ a modified 
currency ratio model to estimate both the volume of “unreported income” and the “tax 
gap” resulting from this underreporting. Our findings suggest that by 2008, unreported 
income was in the neighborhood of $2 trillion resulting in a “tax gap” ranging from $446 
to $490 billion per year. The time series evidence suggests that the ratio of unreported 
income to reported Adjusted Gross Income has reached levels not seen since World War 
II. 
 Given the revised estimates of overseas currency holdings, we reexamine the 
relationship between monetary aggregates and output and inflation. Particular interest 
centers on the question of whether new estimates of domestic currency holdings and of 
domestic monetary aggregates have better predictive power in explaining output and 
price fluctuations than do conventional monetary aggregates that take no account of 
overseas currency holdings. Following the specifications of Friedman and Kuttner (1992) 
we confirm the limited findings of Aksoy and Piskorsky (2006) that the revised domestic 
currency component has significant predictive power for real output and inflation. 
However, with the exception of the domestic M1 money supply in the inflation equation, 
none of the other domestic monetary aggregates appear to have significant predictive 
content for either real output or inflation. Thus, with the surprising exception of the 
domestic monetary component, it appears that adjusting the conventional monetary 
aggregates to reflect only the domestic money supply does not significantly improve the 
predictive power of these aggregates in forecasting future real output or price 
fluctuations. 
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